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Abstract
In this essay, I focus on the initial reaction of the then leadership of the Academy of Management (AOM) to President 
Trump’s travel ban issued in January 2017. By viewing the travel ban in purely administrative terms, AOM leadership framed 
it as an example of “political speech”, on which they were organizationally barred to take a public stand. I subject this view 
to critical assessment, arguing that the travel ban had a distinct moral character, which was antithetical to scholarly values. 
Τhe travel ban, I suggest, should be viewed as a non-prototypical case of political speech, which required AOM leadership 
to flexibly adapt existing rules in situ: to imaginatively frame the travel ban in order to undertake responsible action. Accord-
ingly, the early 2017 AOM rules about political speech should be seen not as recipes-for-action but as reminders-for-action, 
thus allowing an imaginative reframing. Finally, exploring the notion of moral imagination, I distinguish between “disclosive” 
and “incremental” moral imagination and responsibility, and suggest that AOM leadership engaged mainly in the latter.
Keywords Leadership agency · Moral imagination · Framing
Soon after taking office early in 2017, US President Trump 
signed an Executive Order to ban entry into the United 
States of citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries. 
The unequivocal condemnation of the travel ban came from 
multiple directions in the US, including several scholarly 
associations and universities. However, the stand of the 
American Academy of Management (hereafter: AOM) was 
more complicated. Initially, through a letter to its members 
from the then President Professor Anita McGahan, AOM 
affirmed the scholarly values of inclusion and academic 
freedom, and offered affected scholars the technical means 
to be included in the conference program and participate 
virtually to the sessions they would be presenting their work. 
However, unlike other US-based scholarly associations, 
AOM refrained from condemning the Executive Order on 
the grounds that to do so would amount to taking a political 
stand, which was explicitly barred by its binding policies.
Later, in April 2017, following several reactions by mem-
bers to the Academy’s initial response, and instigated by 
Professor McGahan as well as past Academy Presidents, 
AOM amended its policy on taking political stands. The 
new policy, while repeating that AOM leaders are barred 
from stating political views “in the name of AOM or through 
use of AOM resources”, it allows for “exceptional circum-
stances” in which a broadly political stand is permissible to 
be taken by AOM leaders, under certain conditions.1 The 
shift was completed in October 2017, when the new AOM 
President Professor Mary Ann Glynn wrote officially to 
President Trump to “condemn” the travel ban, “as a threat 
to science and scholarship” (although her letter referred not 
to the original Executive Order but to the September 24, 
2017 White House proclamation on visas and immigration), 
especially since “it fundamentally thwarts the Academy’s 
ability to fulfil its mission”.2
It was an interesting trajectory for AOM: from avoiding 
to condemn the travel ban (January 2017), through changing 
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this 
article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1055 1-018-3979-y) contains 
supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
 * Haridimos Tsoukas 
 htsoukas@ucy.ac.cy; Hari.Tsoukas@wbs.ac.uk
1 University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
2 University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
1 See https ://aom.org/About -AOM/Gover nance /AOM-Polic y-on-
Takin g-Stand s.aspx.
2 See http://aom.org/uploa dedFi les/About _AOM/Gover nance /White 
_House _Lette r_10-16-17_FINAL .pdf.
 H. Tsoukas 
1 3
its policies on taking political stands (April 2017), to explic-
itly condemning the travel ban (October 2017). Contrary 
to its initial response, AOM eventually came to implicitly 
accept that threats to scholarly values and activities are not 
narrowly political and, consequently, AOM leaders taking a 
public stand on such issues is not narrowly political either. 
This represents a shift in how AOM sees itself positioned in 
public debates: its original policy of political neutrality in all 
circumstances has given way to a more nuanced approach. 
Such a shift is an implicit admission that its initial reaction 
to the travel ban was inadequate.
The official AOM leadership line was that, given the 
AOM policy on taking political stands in early 2017, con-
demning the travel ban would have amounted to violating 
AOM rules. AOM leadership did what AOM rules had 
allowed it to do. What makes this case particularly interest-
ing is that AOM President McGahan was, as an engaged 
citizen, passionately against the travel ban and, after the 
incident, took the lead to change the AOM policy on taking 
political stands. However, as an AOM leader at the time, 
she found herself unable to act on her beliefs, insofar as 
AOM policies on political speech remained unchanged. 
The broader question is: what understanding of leadership 
agency is manifested when leaders, confronted with contro-
versial situations and pulled in different directions by per-
sonal beliefs and perceived public responsibilities, stick to 
the script of their roles when enacting currently operative 
organizational rules? What conceptions of moral responsi-
bility emerge when, while tackling controversial situations, 
leaders both play by the existing rules and, subsequently, try 
to change the rules they had followed?
In this essay, I will explore these questions by focusing 
mainly on AOM’s initial response to the travel ban. It will 
be insightful to do so since initial responses reflect organi-
zational leaders’ “spontaneous response[s] not mediated 
by mental representations” (Yanow and Tsoukas 2009, p. 
1350), which disclose leaders’ framing of particular awk-
ward situations, thus revealing leaders’ self-understandings 
of their roles at a point in time. While framing is a pro-
cess and, therefore, as the AOM course of action shows, 
evolves as it becomes more deliberately performative (i.e. 
edited and scripted) (Thompson 1995) and/or dialogical (i.e. 
responds to other voices) (Sawyer 2003), focusing on the 
initial framing (the opening linguistic move) in response to 
a situation enables us to get as close as possible to leaders’ 
‘raw’ assumptions underlying their framing of a difficult 
issue (Markova 2003; Gioia 1992).
Drawing on a variety of conceptual resources (i.e. ethical 
decision making, a social-systems conception of politics, 
and theories of moral imagination), I will argue that, early in 
2017, AOM leadership had more options available than they 
realized, had they not been bound by a bureaucratic image 
of leadership, whereby leaders rigidly follow organizational 
rules. Leaders are charged, I will suggest, not only with mak-
ing rules but, also, with taking the risk to adapt existing rules 
in situ and, by doing so, exercise disclosive moral imagi-
nation (i.e. they disclose new possibilities). I will suggest 
an alternative image of leadership that preserves a strong 
conception of agency and moral responsibility.
Persona Non Grata: President Trump’s Travel 
Ban and the Responses to it by Academic 
Organizations, Especially the Academy 
of Management
On January 27th, President Trump signed an Executive 
Order, temporarily stopping all refugee admissions and bar-
ring citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries (Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) from enter-
ing the United States. This travel ban triggered several pro-
tests in the US and worldwide, and met with legal challenges 
in the US. Referring to past and potential terrorist incidents, 
President Trump justified his order as follows:
In order to protect Americans, the United States must 
ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear 
hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles. 
The United States cannot, and should not, admit those 
who do not support the Constitution, or those who 
would place violent ideologies over American law. In 
addition, the United States should not admit those who 
engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including “honor” 
killings, other forms of violence against women, or the 
persecution of those who practice religions different 
from their own) or those who would oppress Ameri-
cans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation. […] It 
is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens 
from foreign nationals who intend to commit terrorist 
attacks in the United States; and to prevent the admis-
sion of foreign nationals who intend to exploit United 
States immigration laws for malevolent purposes.3
3 For the full text, see https ://www.white house .gov/presi denti al-actio 
ns/execu tive-order -prote cting -natio n-forei gn-terro rist-entry -unite 
d-state s/. It should be noted that this travel ban faced legal challenges 
in US courts and was revised in March 2017. A new travel ban, in the 
form of a Proclamation (No. 9645), was issued by President Trump in 
September 2017, which was more far-reaching than the original ban, 
imposing permanent restrictions on travel and including non-Muslim 
countries as well (see New York Times, 24/9/2017). The Proclamation 
was legally challenged by, among others, the state of Hawaii but was 
upheld by the US Supreme Court (New York Times, 26/6/2018). Spe-
cifically, the Supreme Court ruled that “The President has lawfully 
exercised the broad discretion granted to him under § 1182(f) to sus-
pend the entry of aliens into the United States (see https ://www.supre 
mecou rt.gov/opini ons/17pdf /17-965_h315.pdf).
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Several US-based universities and scholarly associations 
clearly and vocally condemned the travel ban. For exam-
ple, the senior leadership of Boston College issued, on 29 
January 2017, a statement to the members of the university 
community, stressing among other things:4
We write as senior leaders at Boston College to object 
to this directive, which has already had disturbing 
effects on individuals and families. This Order under-
mines a key strength of our higher education system, as 
it turns away talented faculty and students who seek to 
immigrate to the United States. […] The Order is also 
contrary to American understandings of this nation’s 
role as a refuge and its place as a society that does 
not discriminate on the basis of religion or national 
origin. This decision also conflicts with the religious 
and educational heritage, beliefs, and values of Boston 
College.
In a similar spirit, forty-eight US university presidents and 
chancellors sent a letter to President Trump, on 2 February 
2017, calling him to rescind the Executive Order, since, “if 
left in place, the order threatens both American higher edu-
cation and the defining principles of our country” (New York 
Review of Books, 9 March 2017). The Society for Social 
Studies of Science issued a statement affirming its “support 
for the protection of academic freedom and human rights 
and to register our condemnation of this Order, and of other 
unjust and unlawful developments as they may arise”.5 The 
American Psychological Association “reaffirmed its oppo-
sition to President Trump’s executive order banning travel 
to the United States by people from six majority-Muslim 
countries”.6 The American Philosophical Association made 
a similar announcement:7
APA’s mission is to foster open dialogue and the free 
exchange of ideas. Inclusion and respect for diverse 
people, religions, cultures, and ideas are at the very 
core of our work. This order goes against these val-
ues—values on which the United States itself was 
founded. […] We stand with learned societies, col-
leges and universities, and others around the world in 
calling on the President and Congress to reverse this 
executive order and to denounce religious intolerance 
in all its forms.
However, the initial response of the Academy of Manage-
ment to the travel ban was markedly different in tone. On 1 
February 2017, the then AOM President, Professor Anita 
McGahan, made an announcement to its members, explain-
ing the position of the Academy8 (the full text is provided 
in the Online Appendix). The following four features are 
noteworthy.
First, the message draws attention to the range of dif-
ferent views on matters of public policy, which member-
ship diversity naturally brings about (“Our members hold a 
range of views on the public policies that have recently been 
implemented”). Thus, on the travel ban, “many members” 
expressed concern about travelling to the Academy’s annual 
meeting; “many” viewed the travel ban as a direct attack 
on scholarship; and some (not many—“a number of you”) 
urged AOM to condemn the travel ban. The range of views 
prepares discursively the reader to accept what comes next: 
sticking to the ‘no-politics’ rules is the optimal strategy (i.e. 
provides a truce) when a professional, diverse body is con-
fronted with politically charged issues. It also tallies with the 
mainstream view that management scholarship is value-free 
(Fougere et al. 2014; Simon 1976, p. 250; see also; Freeman 
et al. 2004; Tsoukas 2018).
Secondly, while diversity was earlier praised, it is now 
presented as a limiting condition on leadership action: “Yet 
because of our very diversity, the AOM has long had a bind-
ing policy that restricts any officer from taking a stand on 
any political issue in the name of the AOM” (my italics). 
The reader is reminded that such a binding policy is justified 
precisely because AOM is a diverse organization and, as a 
result, no particular political views should be asserted in the 
name of AOM. To put it differently, it is as if the AOM Pres-
ident says: ‘even if (or although) I personally want to con-
demn the travel ban, my role as a leader of AOM prevents 
me from doing it’. Notice that the role of the AOM President 
is seen as already formed, so much so that there is no scope 
for an alternative interpretation and, hence, action—leader-
ship agency is thought to be minimal.
Thirdly, the message implicitly opposes the values behind 
the Executive Order by reiterating the Academy’s values: 
“we are committed to inclusion, supportive communities, 
and social and academic freedom as fundamental and unde-
niable tenets of scholarly association. Our values emphasize 
the full diversity of member backgrounds and experiences”. 
In other words, no matter what the US President says and 
does, we, as a scholarly association, value all our members, 
irrespective of nationality and religion.
Fourthly, the message outlines the technical measures 
the Academy pledges to take to “enact [its] values”: (a) 
4 See https ://www.bc.edu/bc-web/bcnew s/campu s-commu nity/annou 
nceme nts/state ment-1-29-17.html.
5 See http://www.4sonl ine.org/item/posit ion_state ment_on_u.s._polit 
ical_situa tion.
6 See http://www.apa.org/news/press /relea ses/2017/06/trave l-ban.
aspx.
7 See http://www.apaon line.org/page/immig ratio neo.
8 See http://aom.org/About -AOM/Gover nance /AOM-Presi dent-s-
Messa ge-on-Execu tive-Order -on-Immig ratio n---Refug ees.aspx.
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“suspend the requirement of attendance as a condition of 
inclusion in the program at the Annual Meeting for those 
affected by the travel restrictions”; and (b) “share with you, 
via our website, the best information that we have about Visa 
application processes for those who want to attend”.
In other words, the AOM President’s initial response to 
the travel ban amounts to the following (my rendition): ‘in 
the aftermath of the travel ban, we as AOM will do anything 
technically possible to facilitate our members’ participation 
in the Annual Meeting in Atlanta. Beyond that, however, 
irrespectively of what each one of us individually feels about 
it, and despite the travel ban opposing our scholarly values, 
there is nothing else really we, as the current AOM leaders, 
can do, since our policies restrict officers from taking a stand 
on any political issue in the name of AOM’.
On Leadership Agency: Framing, Politics, 
and Values
What is most revealing in the AOM President’s message 
is the framing of the challenges confronted. Although the 
travel ban threatens some of the foundational values on 
which scholarly organizations are grounded (especially those 
based in the US, a country with a long tradition of free and 
uninhibited inquiry), AOM leadership chose to view this 
challenge in narrow administrative terms: to lay out techni-
cal steps AOM needs to take to counter the adverse effects 
of the travel ban on some AOM members. Notice that the US 
President’s direct challenge to, among others, scholarly val-
ues is never explicitly addressed. What is addressed are its 
effects, which are sought to be ameliorated through technical 
means. What, therefore, is revealing is the substitution of a 
concern with ends (the scholarly mission of the Academy—
“to build a vibrant and supportive community of scholars by 
markedly expanding opportunities to connect and explore 
ideas”) for a concern with means (how to technically over-
come some of the adverse effects). Tools supersede values.
To be sure, the AOM President’s message does state 
the Academy’s values: “We respect each of our members’ 
voices and seek to amplify their ideas”. However, it does 
not, explicitly defend them when they are challenged by the 
executive power; it rather turns its attention to operational 
matters. The question surely arises: how does AOM mani-
fest its respect of each of its members’ voice when the US 
President, a priori, declares some of its members perso-
nae non gratae? To put it differently, when some of your 
members receive a hostile treatment, don’t you have a moral 
duty to join your voice with that of others to defend them 
publicly? When the values on which your very existence is 
based are under attack, shouldn’t you stand up and, through 
reasoned argument, oppose the attacker? (Chappel 2009, pp. 
104–105). While taking technical steps to ameliorate the 
ban is operationally useful and commendable, limiting your 
reactions to them amounts to missing the point—it is your 
values that are under attack, and it is at this level you should 
seek to have the debate.
To use an analogy, it is as if African Americans or gay 
people in the 1960s had sought to fight discrimination not at 
the level of values and, therefore, the ensuing law and public 
policy (equality of rights), but at the level of technically find-
ing ways to avoid the effects of discrimination. That would 
have shown fatalism, submission, and lack of self-respect. 
Or, to use another analogy, if you were a director of Har-
vey Weinstein’s company, and you knew about Weinstein’s 
alleged sexual predatory habits, would you have a moral 
duty to inform the board or even blow the whistle, or would 
you rather merely admonish prospective female employees 
to find ways of avoiding being alone with him in his hotel 
room? While offering pragmatic advice would be useful, 
surely something more important would be at stake: human 
dignity at work.
In other words, when problematic decisions or practices 
emerge or have long been in place (be they an offensive 
Executive Order, institutionalized discrimination, or habitual 
sexual assaults), what is at stake is not merely how to opera-
tionally ameliorate their awful effects but, more importantly, 
to articulate your principled opposition to their very exist-
ence. Morally disgraceful acts should be primarily opposed 
for what they are, rather than merely seeking ways to circum-
vent their awful effects.
The critical assumption underlying the AOM President’s 
message is to view the travel ban as a political issue. In her 
capacity as the AOM leader, Professor McGahan consist-
ently defended this view. Responding to a Facebook post 
(1.2.2017),9 which argued that the issue is primarily moral, 
not political, she wrote: “I have […] been restricted by the 
policy that binds all AOM Officers at the level of the Acad-
emy and in the Divisions: I cannot represent my personal 
views as those of the AOM. Because the AOM has this pol-
icy, it has no process by which the organization as a whole 
can develop a coherent organizational view”. In a subsequent 
comment, she added: “Officers cannot take stands on politi-
cal policies, even when those policies also are moral in char-
acter. There are two interrelated issues here. The first is that 
the restriction on political speech is constraining all speech 
in this situation. The second is that there is no process for 
achieving an organizational view” (my italics). I find this 
claim problematic.
The literature on behavioural ethics has persistently 
stressed the importance of “frames” (Gioia 1992; Tenbrunsel 
and Smith-Crowe 2008, pp. 561–565; Palazzo et al. 2012; 
9 https ://www.faceb ook.com/perma link.php?story _fbid=17648 77427 
16376 0&id=10000 92456 05843 .
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Schwartz 2016; Trevino et al. 2014) individuals apply to 
decision making. Frames are mental structures that filter 
what individuals see. They simultaneously enable and dis-
able: without the mental boundaries frames impose, percep-
tion and understanding would be impossible. At the same 
time, the same mental boundaries, when rigidly followed, 
tend to lead to mental blind spots (Palazzo et al. 2012). Thus, 
while an “ethical frame” prompts “moral awareness”, lead-
ing to “moral decision making”, by contrast, when a “busi-
ness” or “legal frame” dominates, moral considerations are 
ignored or brushed aside, and “amoral decision making” 
ensues (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008, p. 553).
Behavioural ethics literature has been insightful in 
accounting for “ethical blindness”, namely for the “tempo-
rary inability of a decision maker to see the ethical dimen-
sion of a decision at stake” (Palazzo 2012, p. 325). It is 
only partially helpful, however, in shedding light on our case 
here. Professor McGahan was certainly not plagued by ethi-
cal blindness, far from it. An important feature of ethical 
blindness is that it is “unconscious” (Palazzo et al. 2012, p. 
325): decision makers are not aware of deviating from the 
values they hold. However, this is not the case here. In her 
personal communication, Professor McGahan is very much 
aware of both her personal values and the official restric-
tions she is bound by. She commented on a Facebook post: 
“I’ve been quite clear where I stand on this as an individual: 
I abhor the Trump policy. I’ve signed petitions, given to the 
ACLU, and am reaching out to my colleagues and friends 
to offer support”. Moreover, after this incident, she was the 
driving force for making the case that AOM should recon-
sider its policy on political speech (which it did at its Board 
of Governors’ regular meeting on 21 April 2017). One can 
plausibly guess how conflicted she must have been in formu-
lating her official response to the Executive Order. Clearly, in 
her case, private preferences collided with perceived public 
responsibility (Nelson 2008, p. 473).
However, although the AOM President does not appear to 
be ethically blind, she does come across as “rigidly” apply-
ing a particular frame (Palazzo et al. 2012, p. 326)—the 
bureaucratic frame (Jackal 1988; Anteby 2013). The latter 
consists of a mental structure that highlights the importance 
of rules and rule following (Zimbardo 2007). In our case, 
the bureaucratic frame dictates that all public statements 
and decisions made by politicians (especially government 
leaders and members of Congress) are necessarily political 
and, therefore, AOM leaders “[cannot] take a stand on any 
political issue in the name of the AOM”—“restriction on 
political speech is constraining all speech in this situation”.
“Rigid framing” (Palazzo et al. 2012, p. 326) involves 
individuals locked in a particular frame, unable to make 
substantial use of alternative frames. When the bureau-
cratic frame is rigidly applied, one’s role is seen as already 
defined, its boundaries pre-determined, and its performance 
strictly governed by set rules. Personal beliefs and emotions, 
as well as job crafting, are brushed aside (Hirschhorn 1997; 
Wrzesniewski and Dutton 2001): the role strictly circum-
scribes personal agency. In the case at hand, although the 
AOM President does not dismiss the moral nuances of the 
travel ban, she insists that they are subsumed under the cat-
egory “political speech” (“Officers cannot take stands on 
political policies, even when those policies also are moral in 
character”, my italics), which prevents her from condemn-
ing the travel ban. This rigid framing shows a restricted 
understanding of politics and a narrow conception of what 
ethical leadership is about. Let me explain.
Like all concepts, “politics” is a radially structured con-
ceptual category (Lakoff 1987, 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 
1999): some of its members are more centrally placed—
namely they are more representative—than others. To put it 
more generally, conceptual categories are “not definable in 
terms of some list of properties shared by every member of 
the category. Instead, they are characterized by variations 
on a central model” (Lakoff 1996, pp. 7–8). Specifically, 
conceptual categories are structured in terms of “prototypi-
cal” (i.e. central) and “non-prototypical” (i.e. peripheral) 
members, with the latter radiating at various conceptual 
distances from the former. For example, a sparrow is a more 
prototypical member of the concept “bird” than an ostrich 
is (Lakoff 1987, p. 83; Johnson 1993). “Harm” is radially 
structured too: physical harm lies at its prototypical core, 
while other types of harm (political, financial, psychologi-
cal, etc.) are non-prototypical variations on it. Similarly, 
President Trump’s legislation for tax reform (including tax 
cuts for the well-off) or his executive orders to dismantle 
Obamacare are prototypical members of “politics” as under-
stood in the modern party-based political system. However, 
issues related to abortions, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, 
or scholarly communication are not narrowly (that is, pro-
totypically) “political”; they are non-prototypical instances 
of politics.
Notice that there is nothing inherent in concepts that will 
separate the prototypical core from the non-prototypical 
periphery—concepts have no essence (Lakoff 1996, p. 9). It 
is how concepts are embedded into a community’s form of 
life that enables its members to make distinctions of repre-
sentativeness in concepts. For example, insofar as we share 
the same form of life, we know what “lying” is, namely we 
know what are characteristic (i.e. prototypical, representa-
tive) cases of “lying”, just as we know what non-prototypical 
cases of “lying” are (white lies, official lies, social lies, eco-
nomical with the truth, etc.) (Johnson 1993, p. 99). When we 
encounter an actual case of lying, we exercise our interpre-
tive agency to understand what sort of lying it is.
Likewise, when we encounter a decision by a government 
leader, we exercise our “moral imagination” (Arendt 1982; 
Johnson 1993; Werhane 1998) to make sense of it. In the 
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modern, liberal-democratic form of life that is characteristic 
of the US polity, a law about tax cuts or health care provision 
is plausibly thought to fall within the conventional bounds of 
government activity, and hence it is prototypically political. 
However, President Trump’s travel ban is not: it arbitrarily 
(i.e. without providing evidence and calibrating real risks, 
as the 48 senior US university leaders noted in their let-
ter) extends politics into, among others, the scholarly realm, 
which, in our form of life, does not ordinarily belong to it.
Politics involves the legitimate exercise of power for the 
implementation of collectively binding decisions (Luhmann 
2013). However, in our form of life (i.e. in highly differen-
tiated modern liberal democracies, Luhmann 2013), most 
issues do not require, in the first place, collectively binding 
decisions (King and Thornhill 2005, p. 70; Moeller 2012, p. 
91), since they originate in systems different from the politi-
cal system. For example, issues like generating knowledge, 
treating illnesses, or the aesthetic worth of paintings are not 
directly political but originate in non-political systems such 
as, respectively, science, medicine, and art. The political sys-
tem may be called upon to regulate these other systems (and, 
thus, produce collectively binding decisions) as, for exam-
ple, when a particular method of knowledge production may 
violate human dignity or animal welfare, but the application 
of political power is “residual” (King and Thornhill 2005, p. 
71)—non-political systems retain their relatively independ-
ent codes of operation and, thus, the issues to be regulated 
originate outside the political system (Luhmann 2013).
Thus, an important condition (which, in the course of 
time, has become a central value) for the operation of the 
science system, in the liberal-democratic form of life at 
least, has historically been freedom of speech and uninhib-
ited communication among scientists. When the executive 
power arbitrarily intervenes to regulate such a condition, 
it threatens to politicize an issue that originates in a sys-
tem different from politics (i.e. scholarly communication). 
The travel ban threatens to turn scholarly communication (a 
residually/non-prototypically political issue) into a proto-
typical political issue (i.e. who is/is not entitled to cross our 
border), without offering clear and convincing evidence for 
doing so. Scholarly values are trampled by narrowly political 
aims, for no superior reason. Producing a collectively bind-
ing decision like the travel ban might have been a superior 
reason if the US was, say, at war with any of the countries 
included in the travel ban, but this is not the case. Holding 
a passport of any of the seven Muslim-majority countries 
does not turn one to a potential terrorist, nor does it make 
one “bear hostile attitudes toward [USA] and its founding 
principles”,10 nor does it instil intentions in one “to commit 
terrorist attacks in the United States”.11 The Executive Order 
makes a host of unwarranted assumptions that do not stand 
to rational scrutiny.
To better appreciate this, consider the following two 
cases. First, The World Academy of Sciences (TWAS) 
interim Executive Director Professor Mohamed Hassan, a 
Sudanese mathematician, commented on how the travel ban 
prevented him from travelling to the US. He wrote:12
I am a citizen of Sudan, and I have joint citizenship in 
Italy. I have lived and worked in Italy for more than 
30 years, and I work with scientists and policymak-
ers at very high levels in the United States and world-
wide. There is constant travel, a constant exchange 
between international scientists. We meet, we hear 
presentations, we debate, and from this process flow 
ideas about new research, or new policy to support 
research. Now, following this order, I have cancelled 
my arrangements to attend the annual meeting next 
week of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science. Why? Because I am Sudanese, and 
I am barred from traveling to the United States. The 
American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence (AAAS) meeting is major event in the scientific 
calendar, and AAAS is a very close partner to TWAS.
Look now at another similar case, which is even more reveal-
ing of the personal circumstances of the scholar involved, 
thus, enabling us to better understand the effect of the travel 
ban on scholarly activities and lives. A leading US-based 
academic who did not hold American citizenship at the time 
had committed to attend an important academic meeting at 
a European university in March 2017. I was due to take 
part in that meeting too. Three days after the travel ban was 
announced, he withdrew. In his letter to his hosts, he wrote:13
I am still an Egyptian citizen, living in the US on a 
green card (permanent resident), and going through 
naturalization to become a US citizen. Even through 
Egypt is not covered by President Trump’s recent ban, 
I talked to our [university’s] international office. They 
cautioned me not to travel unless it is “really a mat-
ter of life and death”. There have been several cases 
where green card holders from countries not covered 
by the ban were not admitted into the US. From all we 
know they are Muslim, which I am. So I feel really 
awkward as I have been looking [forward] to attending 
[the meeting]. Now my wife is also strongly objecting 
10 See https ://www.white house .gov/presi denti al-actio ns/execu tive-
order -prote cting -natio n-forei gn-terro rist-entry -unite d-state s/.
11 See https ://www.white house .gov/presi denti al-actio ns/execu tive-
order -prote cting -natio n-forei gn-terro rist-entry -unite d-state s/.
12 https ://twas.org/artic le/twas-us-trave l-order -profo undly -disru ptive .
13 Personal communication. Permission granted.
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to me travelling. Under the circumstances and given 
the short time between now and [the meeting], is it 
possible for me to participate by video or skype? I 
know it is not ideal.
Notice how, in both cases, scholarly communication is seri-
ously disrupted and, following the ban, purely scholarly vis-
its turned out to have been impossible to make, for no reason 
whatsoever related to the individuals at hand. Moreover, as 
it is clear in the second case, the travel ban instils fear in the 
lives of those potentially affected (including their families), 
thus further inhibiting scholarly work and communication. 
Notice also that, in the circumstances, the professor in the 
second case offered to participate in the meeting by video 
or skype. This was a morally appropriate suggestion for him 
(i.e. at the individual level), in the sense that he wanted to 
honour his promise and, thus, discharge his obligation to 
his hosts to participate in the meeting, in the most feasible 
manner available.
However, a similar technical suggestion, which, as seen 
earlier, had also been made by AOM was, in moral terms, an 
inadequate response. AOM’s primary moral obligation as an 
organization is to defend the values that define the telos of 
the scholarly “practice world” (Spinosa et al. 1997, p. 17) its 
members inhabit, since it is those values that make scholarly 
activity and communication possible, in the first place. To 
put it more generally, for a scholarly organization to enact 
its particular telos (i.e. a scholarly purpose), it would involve 
not merely finding the most effective means to facilitate its 
members’ communication, but also honouring the “value 
commitment” (Selznick 1984, p. 55) its telos constitutes 
(Selznick 1992; Sayer 2011).
Leadership, Moral Imagination, 
and Undecidability
The key question for AOM leadership early in 2017 was 
whether the travel ban constituted a prototypical case of 
“political speech” or not. The view prevailed that it did. 
However, the then AOM President seemed to nurture some 
doubts, as she allowed for the possibility that the travel ban 
might have a “moral character” and, hence, it might not be a 
prototypical case of political speech. Still, however, the view 
adopted by AOM leadership was that even morally loaded 
issues, when part of the public debate, are necessarily “polit-
ical” (“the restriction on political speech is constraining all 
speech in this situation”). It is important to stress that this is 
an interpretative act, by no means the only one conceivable.
Had the AOM leadership opposed the travel ban, they 
would not, I suggest, have done so on narrowly political 
grounds, but would have opposed the arbitrary politici-
zation of scholarly communication on grounds of moral 
values that are internal to the practice world of AOM and 
the science system at large (MacIntyre 1985; Moore 2017; 
Tsoukas 2018). When AOM restricts its officials from tak-
ing a political stand (as it rightly should), it is the proto-
typical instances—the prototypical image—of politics it 
implicitly refers to. To denounce the travel ban, the AOM 
leaders would need to exercise their “moral imagination” 
(Arendt 1982; Johnson 1993) to frame it as a non-proto-
typically political issue.
Imagination, writes Arendt (2003, p. 139) “designates 
my ability to have an image in my mind of something that 
is not present”. When I look at a “slum dwelling”, for 
example, I imagine what is not exhibited directly, namely 
“poverty and misery” (Arendt 2003, p. 140). When some-
thing becomes an object of thought, it is always a “re-pres-
entation” (Arendt 2003, p. 165) of something or somebody 
which, by virtue of imagination, becomes “present in the 
form of an image” (op. cit.). A rigidly bureaucratic fram-
ing provides the prototypical image of organizational rules 
that need to be faithfully followed. Thus, in our case, the 
travel ban is seen as a narrowly political decision, since an 
external political authority (the US President) had issued 
it. A less rigid framing, however, would have viewed it as 
an attempt by executive power to, among others, arbitrar-
ily politicize a scholarly issue, which would need to be 
resisted on the grounds of scholarly values.
The situations in which leaders find themselves do not 
come with descriptions attached—they are framed in order 
to be acted upon (Palazzo et al. 2012). Leadership agency 
comes with interpretative agency: the ability to review 
one’s role and envision possibilities for the organization. 
This is particularly the case when non-prototypical situa-
tions are encountered, since they are the most open-ended. 
Thus, insofar as a political decision has a distinct “moral 
character”, it particularly lends itself to multiple inter-
pretations, since it deviates from prototypically political 
decisions. As Johnson (1993:203) insightfully remarks, 
“the envisioning of possibilities for fruitful, meaningful, 
and constructive action requires moral imagination. […] 
We must be able to imagine new dimensions for our char-
acter, new directions for our relationships with others, and 
even new forms of social organization”. Moral imagina-
tion, thus conceived, is “disclosive” (Lara 2007, p. 66; 
Spinosa et al. 1997, p. 22): it is especially manifested in 
action when leaders exercise their perceptive capacity for 
envisioning new possibilities (Nussbaum 1999) through 
re-examining dominant metaphors, prototypes, and nar-
ratives (Johnson 1993, p. 198). Insofar as rules are inher-
ently unable to tackle non-prototypical cases, leaders need 
to imaginatively extend rules, thus refining the meaning 
of the prototypes they historically refer to. Metaphorical 
re-description is usually the most important vehicle for 
doing this (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).
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The AOM leadership’s initial response not to condemn 
the travel ban is intelligible relative to the background ideal-
ized cognitive model (Lakoff 1987) AOM has adopted about 
non-political speech by its officials. However, the in-built 
indeterminacy of radially structured concepts implies that 
there is always scope for imaginatively projecting beyond 
the prototypical cases that define the background ideal-
ized cognitive model to non-prototypical ones, even those 
that originally were not part of the concept (Johnson 1993, 
p. 98). The metaphor underlying AOM leadership’s early 
action is that of rules-as-recipes-for-action. An alternative 
metaphor might be rules-as-reminders.
For the rules-as-recipes-for-action metaphor, rules 
prescribe conduct (Dewey 1960). Particular cases are 
approached from the standpoint of the prototypical mem-
bers of the conceptual category included in the rules—the 
particular case is adapted to the rule, not vice versa (Toulmin 
2001). Thus seen, the Executive Order (i.e. the particular 
case), issued by a political authority, falls into the prototypi-
cal core of “political speech” (conceptual category), about 
which AOM has a rule. However, change the metaphor and 
you obtain a different frame.
The AOM rule barring political speech should be seen, I 
suggest, not so much as a recipe for action as a “reminder” 
(Johnson 1993, p. 105; Tsoukas 2016, p. 169) of what is 
thought to be important—political impartiality. Rules under-
stood as reminders are “crystallizations of the insights that 
emerge out of people’s ongoing experience. As such, they 
provide ideals that establish standpoints from which to view 
and evaluate our experience and our proposed actions” 
(Johnson 1993, p. 105). Thus seen, the Executive Order is 
a non-prototypical case of political speech—it has a dis-
tinct moral penumbra, as rightly acknowledged by the AOM 
President. Accordingly, the AOM rule for “non-political 
speech” may be seen as a standpoint from which to evalu-
ate the particular case at hand. Seeing the Executive Order 
as a non-prototypical case of political speech, the leader is 
enabled to imaginatively refine (rather than merely ‘apply’) 
the rule—the particular case provides an occasion for fur-
ther specifying what the rule is about (Tsoukas 2016, pp. 
168–169). In flexibly framing the case at hand, the leader not 
only handles it imaginatively, but he/she refines the scope of 
the rule as well (Shotter and Tsoukas 2014a, b).
Refining the scope of a rule in situ is an act of disclosive 
moral responsibility, which goes beyond rules or analysis. 
For Derrida the agent is truly responsible insofar as he/she 
moves beyond calculative reasoning (Reynolds 2004, p. 51; 
Edward 2016, pp. 356–357). If one makes a decision by 
simply applying a rule, responsibility is removed from the 
agent (Fagan 2016, p. 73; Derrida 2002b, pp. 252–256)—the 
decision is made by the rule, not the agent. As von Foerster 
(1991, p. 64) aptly notes, “all decidable questions are already 
decided by the choice of the relational framework within 
which these questions have been posed, together with the 
rules that connect any proposition (say, ‘the question’), with 
any other proposition (say, ‘the answer’) within that frame-
work”. A decision does not follow from calculating pros and 
cons—that would be a mere intellectual exercise. A decision 
that is the outcome of mere calculations (even if those calcu-
lations include the effects on others), or flows logically from 
certain premises, is not genuinely a decision—an algorithm 
could have reached it (Lynch 2016, pp. 163–167; Christian 
and Griffiths 2017). What makes it a genuine decision is 
that “it must invoke that which is outside of the subject’s 
control” (Reynolds 2004, p. 48)—the instant of decision is 
a non-rational commitment. In Derrida’s words: “a decision 
that would not go through the test and ordeal of the unde-
cidable would not be a free decision; it would only be the 
programmable application or the continuous unfolding of 
a calculable process” (Derrida 2002b, p. 252). Taking the 
decision requires a leap of faith from the agent.
Undecidability—the space between sensing what one 
needs to do and doing it—is an ineliminable part of deci-
sion making, inviting the agent to undertake a leap of faith 
(Caputo 2004). As Derrida (2002a, p. 232) notes, “if there is 
no “experience” of the undecidable at the moment of deci-
sion, then the decision will be nothing but the mechanical 
application of a rule”. Note that undecidability does not 
mean indecision, apathy or wavering between alternatives, 
nor does it indicate “a moment to be overcome by the occur-
rence of the decision” (Derrida 1996, p. 87). The opposite 
of undecidability “is not decisiveness but programmability” 
(Caputo 2004, p. 17), “calculability” and “formalizability” 
(Caputo 1997, p. 137). Undecidability is “the ongoing con-
dition of possibility of decision demanding the constant 
renewal of decision” (Caputo 2004, p. 17).
Derrida offers some interesting reflections on undecid-
ability. He writes: “[A] decision, if there is one, cannot take 
place without the undecidable, it cannot be resolved through 
knowledge. […] If I know what is to be done, if my theoreti-
cal analysis of the situation shows me what is to be done […] 
then there is no moment of decision, simply the application 
of a body of knowledge, or, at the very least, a rule of norm. 
[…] One must know as much as possible, one must deliber-
ate, reflect, let things mature. But, however long this process 
lasts, however careful one is in the theoretical preparation 
of the decision, the instant of the decision, if there is to be 
a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of 
knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility” (Derrida 
2002a, p. 231). Whatever rule governing a decision, when 
applied, it would need to both conserve the rule and “sus-
pend it enough to have to reinvent it enough in each case” 
(Derrida 1992, p. 26). In short, in taking a decision, a rule 
is both confirmed and reinstituted.
On this view, leadership becomes disclosively responsi-
ble, insofar as the leader, in making a decision, goes beyond 
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the ‘rules’, makes the unauthorized move, and momentarily 
breaks undecidability through a leap of faith. Disclosively 
responsible leadership both experiences and breaks unde-
cidability. Insofar as leadership is a continuing process, 
responsibility is ongoing—it is, in Derrida’s (2002a, p. 232) 
word, “infinite”. One never dispenses with one’s responsi-
bility (Caputo 2004). Thus, to invoke the absence of rules 
for authorizing a leader to make a “political” statement, 
in the face of the travel ban, as a justification for treating 
the latter as a merely technical matter, is to sweep unde-
cidability under the carpet, not break it. It is when current 
rules are imaginatively applied to particular situations that 
makes those rules reinstituted—refined, revised, reinvented. 
The normative spirit of the rule is preserved not by leader’s 
conformity to its prototypical core but by taking the risk to 
extend it, in particular circumstances.
Having said all this, seeing the entire trajectory of AOM’s 
response to the travel ban, enables us to see moral imagina-
tion and responsibility in more nuanced terms. Although, 
judged by the criterion of disclosive moral imagination, the 
AOM President shows a restricted understanding of leader-
ship agency, the picture is more complex, since she subse-
quently took the lead to change the organization from within, 
namely change AOM’s policy on taking political stands. 
While in her initial official response to the travel ban she 
fails to disclosively respond to the undecidable or “ineffa-
ble” (Lara 2007, p. 66), through her subsequent initiative 
to change AOM policy she succeeds to envision a different 
AOM, namely an organization whose leadership does not 
hesitate to take a public stand when core Academy values are 
under threat.14 In the first case, we have moral imagination 
as disclosive power (i.e. by imaginatively extending current 
rules in situ, the leader discloses new possibilities); in the 
second case, we encounter moral imagination as incremental 
force (i.e. the leader draws on hitherto experience and seeks 
alliances to realize a new possibility for the future). Moral 
imagination as disclosive power is value-rational, politically 
risky, procedurally controversial, and potentially transforma-
tional. Moral imagination as incremental force is instrumen-
tally rational, politically safer, procedurally compliant, and 
incremental. AOM President McGahan scores low in moral 
imagination as disclosive power and high in moral imagina-
tion as incremental force.
Concluding Remarks
AOM’s new policy on taking political stands, for which Pro-
fessor McGahan deserves credit in pushing through, states 
that “under exceptional circumstances, and with the con-
sensual support of the Executive Committee and approval 
of the Board of Governors, the President is authorized to 
issue a statement on behalf of the AOM when a public policy 
action threatens the existence, purpose, or functioning of the 
AOM as an organization”.15 I hope this essay has provided a 
robust rationale for justifying the new policy: in the language 
used here, the revised policy allows AOM to both bar proto-
typically political stands and take a stand on AOM-relevant 
public policy issues.
However, it should be noted that while the revised policy 
helps clarify that occasions may arise in the public sphere 
in which the AOM President may need to take a stand on 
behalf of the Academy, deciding what these “exceptional cir-
cumstances” are remains the responsibility of its leaders, for 
which no rules will ever be complete, nor will anything spare 
leaders from the experience (and the burden) of undecid-
ability (Caputo 2000). The moral responsibility of the AOM 
President remains “infinite” (Derrida 2002a, p. 232) even (or 
especially) in those occasions in which the Executive Com-
mittee and the Board of Governors may refuse to authorize 
his/her public stand on a particular issue. In other words, 
no matter how refined the rules may be or how explicit the 
authorization procedures are, taking a responsible decision 
will always involve a leap of faith and the assumption of 
personal risk. The spectre of disclosive moral imagination 
will haunt leaders. No one can relieve a leader’s burden, it 
comes with the territory: he/she must decide those questions 
that are undecidable. As von Foerster wisely observed “only 
those questions that are in principle undecidable, we can 
decide” (1991, p. 64, italics in the original).
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